Bounding Preference Parameters under Different Assumptions about Beliefs: a Partial Identification Approach by Bellemare, Charles et al.
      
Bellemare : Corresponding author. Département d’économique, Université Laval 
cbellemare@ecn.ulaval.ca 
Bissonnette : Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University 
l.bissonnette@uvt.nl 
Kröger : Département d’économique, Université Laval 
skroger@ecn.ulaval.ca 
 
 
Part of this paper first appeared in Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (2007). An OX code with files implementing 
all the procedures discussed in this paper can be downloaded at http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/charles.bellemare/. We 
thank Jim Cox and the Economic Science Laboratory in Tucson, Arizona, for financial and technical support, Urs 
Fischbacher for his support in programming the experiment, Wafa Hakim for her research assistance in conducting 
the experiment, and two reviewers for comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 10-17 
 
 
 
 
Bounding Preference Parameters under Different Assumptions About Beliefs: A 
Partial Identification Approach 
 
 
Charles Bellemare 
Luc Bissonnette 
Sabine Kröger 
 
 
Mai/May  2010 
Abstract:   
We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various 
levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We 
contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using 
non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected 
responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment 
in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. 
This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs. 
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1 Introduction
A recent development in econometrics concerns the identification and estimation of
econometric models that are partially identified (see Manski and Tamer (2002)). A
model is partially identified if it maintains weaker assumptions than are necessary
to point identify the parameters of interest. The approach allows researchers to un-
derstand what can be learned about a parameter of interest under different sets of
assumptions, some potentially more plausible than others. Each set of assumptions
can be used to place bounds around the model parameters of interest. These bounds
in turn define the so-called identification region of the model parameters that con-
tains all parameter vectors which are consistent with the data given the maintained
assumptions. The identification regions can in turn be used to perform specification
tests of the validity of maintaining stronger assumptions to point identify the model
parameters. In particular, maintaining stronger but invalid assumptions concerning
key variables may yield point estimates that fall outside the identification region de-
rived under weaker assumptions.
Early applications have focused on placing bounds around moments or quan-
tiles of a conditional distribution (see Manski (1989, 1994)) . These applications are
non-parametric in nature: identification regions around moments or quantiles are es-
timated using the data alone without referring to a specific parametric model. More
recently, the approach has been extended to make inferences on parameters of incom-
plete parametric and semi-parametric models (see Manski and Tamer (2002)). Appli-
cations of the later include Honore´ and Tamer (2006) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
To our knowledge, these methods have yet to be applied to experimental data.
In this paper we illustrate the usefulness of these methods by making inferences
on preferences in a choice problem with uncertainty under different assumptions
about the beliefs of players.1 More specifically, we specify a simple model of sender
1This paper relates to two approaches used so far to separately identify the effects of preferences
and beliefs on decision making under uncertainty. The first approach compares behavior in treat-
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behavior in a binary investment game (see Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)). We
model decisions of senders as a function of their expected final payoffs (which proxies
their trust in the responder), a component capturing other-regarding preferences, and
an unobserved random component. We focus on relating the size of the identification
regions to the restrictiveness of the assumptions maintained on the beliefs of senders.
We explore three different sets of assumptions. The first and weakest set of assump-
tions states that researchers have no information about beliefs of senders apart from
the natural restrictions imposed by the game (e.g., the amount returned must be be-
low and above known boundaries). The second set of assumptions states that all
senders expect to receive not less when they invest than when they do not. This
second set is more restrictive than the first. As a result, we expect the identification
region under the second set to be contained in the identification region derived under
the first set of assumptions. The third and most restrictive set of assumptions we con-
sider consists of assuming that senders have rational expectations. We show that the
latter set of assumptions produce the smallest identification region of the three we
consider. Finally, we point estimate our model parameters using non-incentivized
beliefs stated by senders in the experiment. Our point estimates suggests that ex-
pectations about responder behavior as well as other-regarding preferences are both
significant determinants of investments. Moreover, we find that our point estimates
fall within the first two identification regions. This suggests that reasonable infer-
ences on preferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design and the data. Section 3 the econometric model. Section 4 presents our results.
Section 5 concludes.
ments with uncertainty with behavior in treatments where uncertainty is blocked by design (see, e.g.,
Cox (2004)). The second approach uses data on subjective beliefs to recover estimates of preference
parameters (see, e.g., Bellemare, Kro¨ger, and van Soest (2008)).
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2 Experimental design and procedure
2.1 Experimental design
Our experimental design is a modified version of the two player investment game
of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In our experiment, senders and responders
were both endowed with 6$US.2 Contrary to Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), we
restricted the decision space of senders to two choices: investing all or none of the
endowment. If a sender invested his endowment, that amount was doubled and
added to the endowment of the responder. In turn, the responder had the opportunity
to return any amount from his augmented endowment to the sender (i.e., he could
return up to 18$).3 If the sender did not invest his endowment, the responder could
return any amount from his initial endowment (up to 6$).
Responders made their decisions using the strategy method: they each had to de-
cide how much to return when the sender invested his endowment, and how much
to return when the sender would not invest his endowment. The decision that corre-
sponded to the actual choice of the sender was chosen to be the effective action and
determined the payoff of both participants. After making their decisions, senders
were asked to state their subjective beliefs. Before stating their beliefs, they were fur-
ther reminded of the decision tasks and given examples to clarify the belief elicitation
procedure. Senders were not rewarded for the accuracy of their beliefs.
Senders had to state their subjective beliefs in two scenarios. They were first asked
to state their beliefs if they did not invest. In particular, they had to state how many
out of 100 responders would return 0$, and how many would return amounts in the
following intervals f(0, 1], (1, 2], (2, 3], (3, 4], (4, 5], (5, 6]g.4 By allowing senders to
2The complete content of the computer screens can be downloaded from
http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/charles.bellemare/.
3Expending the choice set of senders is in principle possible, but this will require asking each par-
ticipant to answer many more questions on their beliefs (see below).
4If the probability mass entered exceeded 100, senders where automatically instructed to go back
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place a positive probability on getting back 0, we allow their subjective distribution
functions to be censored from below. Additionally, senders were asked to state their
beliefs about responder behavior if they invested their endowment. Senders were
asked to state how many out of 100 responders would return 0$, and how many
would return amounts in the following intervals f(0, 3], (3, 6], (6, 9], (9, 12], (12, 15],
(15, 18]g.5,6
2.2 Experimental procedure
After all participants had made their decisions, senders and responders were ran-
domly matched and payoffs were computed based on the decisions of the pair. Par-
ticipants were then informed of the outcome of the experiment and their final payoffs.
The experiment was conducted in May 2005 at the Economic Science Laboratory at
the University of Arizona using the software zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). Participants
were recruited via email and were mainly students in finance, business administra-
tion, economics, and engineering. Participants received a 5$ show-up fee upon arrival
at the laboratory. We observed 38 pairs of players in 9 sessions of the experiment. An
experimental session lasted on average 60 minutes, and, including their show up fee,
participants earned on average 12.18$ (9.92$ for senders and 15.87$ for responders).
and adjust their answers.
5In order to detect whether senders stated beliefs to rationalize their decisions, we randomized
approximately one third of all participants in our experiment to a group of “observers” who did not
make any decisions but who answered the belief questions after having read the same instructions
as all other participants. Observers received each 6$ for their participation. We found no significant
differences between the beliefs of senders and those of observers. See the extended working paper
version of the paper for details (Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kro¨ger, 2007).
6At the end of the experiment we elicited participants’ risk preferences. We asked participants
to play a sequence of lotteries similar to that proposed by Holt and Laury (2002). We will not dis-
cuss those results further as we found no significant relationship between measured risk preferences
and investment behavior. Similar results have been reported by Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Houser,
Schunk, and Winter (2010).
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2.3 Descriptive statistics
24 of the 38 senders (63%) invested their endowment. To gain some insights on
whether investors and non-investors trusted responders differently, we compare the
subjective belief distributions of investors with those of non-investors. Figure 1 presents
the average subjective belief distributions of investors (light bars, N = 24) and non
investors (dark bars, N = 14). We find that both groups had similar beliefs about
responder behavior if they consider not investing their endowment. In particular,
both investors and non investors place on average a very high probability of getting
nothing back from responders. In fact, we fail to find significant differences between
the distribution of beliefs of investors and non-investors in each of the seven brackets
of amounts reported in Figure 1.7
Differences between both investors and non-investors emerge when we look at
their beliefs when investing their endowment. There, non-investors placed a 48.3%
probability on getting nothing back from responders, substantially less than the 24.6%
probability placed by investors. A Mann-Whitney U test easily rejects the null hy-
pothesis that the distributions of beliefs about getting nothing back when investing
are the same (p-value = 0.012). Moreover, Mann-Whitney U tests reject the null hy-
pothesis that distributions of beliefs of investors and non-investors for the interval
(9, 12] are the same (p-value = 0.050). Together these results suggest that investors
expect to get more when investing their endowment than non-investors.8
To assess whether the beliefs of senders were rational, we computed for each
sender the deviation of their subjective expectations how much the responder would
return when they would invest (when they would not invest) and the observed aver-
age amount returned for this case 0.26$ (observed average when not investing: 3.66$).
7We tested for each interval (0, (0, 1], . . .) the null hypothesis the distributions of beliefs are the
same for investors and non-investors using a Mann-Whitney U test. The lowest p-value out of the
seven intervals tested is 0.238.
8We do not find significant differences between the distributions of beliefs of both groups in the
intervals (0, 3], (3, 6], (6, 9], (12, 15], and (15, 18].
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Figure 2 presents the distributions of these differences. We find small discrepancies
between expectations and observed responses when not investing, reflecting the fact
that most senders correctly anticipated that the probability of getting close to nothing
would be high when not investing. More substantial discrepancies emerge when con-
sidering amounts returned when investing. There, we find that a substantial amount
of senders have expectations below and above the observed amount returned. Even
though we fail to reject the Null hypothesis that the median deviation is equal to zero
in both cases (p-value = 0.545 when not investing and 0.354 when investing), we find
that the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distributions are significantly different from
0.9 Deviations observed in Figure 2 may also reflect noise rather than genuine devia-
tions from rational expectations. Separating noise from true underlying beliefs is out
of the scope of the paper. However, if beliefs are mostly noise, they should be poorly
related to decisions of senders. This issue is discussed in the next section.
3 A Simple Model of Choice
We assume that the utility of not investing for sender i is given by ukeepi = b(w+ r
keep
i ),
where rkeepi denotes the amount the responder returns to sender i when i does not
invest, w denotes the initial endowment of sender i, and b measures the marginal
utility of income. The amount returned when not investing rkeepi can vary between 0
and the endowment w = 6$ of the responder.
When sender i invests, he foregoes his endowment w which is then doubled and
transferred to the responder. As a result, a surplus of w is created when investing.
We model the utility of investing as uinvesti = br
invest
i + q, where r
invest
i denotes the
amount returned by the responder when investing,10 and q captures any utility gain
9We reject the Null hypothesis that the deviation is equal to zero at the 25th and 75th percentiles
for both scenarios (p-value=0.000 and 0.042 when not investing and p-value=0.020 and 0.029 when
investing).
10The amount returned rinvesti by the responder can take a value between 0 and 3w = 18$.
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coming from some form of other regarding preferences, whether it is a concern for
efficiency or altruism.11 Recent studies suggest that concerns for social efficiency may
be particularly important (see Engelmann and Strobel (2004)). In terms of our model,
this would imply that q > 0.
We next assume that senders make their decisions by comparing their subjective
expected utilities of investing and not investing. The expected utilities of not invest-
ing and investing are given by
E

ukeepi

= b

w+ E

rkeepi

+ e
keep
i (1)
E

uinvesti

= bE

rinvesti

+ q + einvesti , (2)
where the expectations are computed with respect to the subjective distribution func-
tions of sender i. To allow for the fact that some senders will make sub-optimal
choices, we add standard normal error terms einvesti and e
keep
i to the true expected
utilities E(uinvesti ) and E(u
keep
i ), and assume that sender i chooses the option j 2
fkeep, investg that maximizes E(uji) + eji rather than E(uji).
4 Identification regions of the model parameters
We first characterize the identification region of (b, q) that is consistent with the ob-
served choice distribution of senders without imposing any information on beliefs.
To estimate this region, we first consider the extreme case where all senders expect to
receive with probability 1 the highest possible amount when investing (rinvest = 3w)
and the lowest possible amount when not investing (rkeep = 0). This gives rise to
the largest payoff difference between investing and not investing. In this case, the
decision rule is to invest when E
 
uinvesti

> E(ukeepi ), or equivalently
b(2w) + q + ei > 0. (3)
11The preferences presented here are equivalent to linear altruism (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002):
ui = axi + gxj with b = a  g, q = g  3w where xi = rinvest and xj = (3w  rinvest) denote income of
player i and j. For the case of not investing, g = 0. Our data does not allow us to identify more general
preferences (for instance as in Charness and Rabin (2002)).
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where ei = einvesti   ekeepi . A second extreme case occurs when all senders expect to
receive with probability 1 the lowest amount possible when investing (rinvest = 0),
and the highest possible amount when they do not invest (rkeep = w). This gives rise
to the smallest payoff difference between investing and not investing. In this case,
senders i will invest when
b( 2w) + q + ei > 0. (4)
Assuming that errors ei are statistically independent of each other and follow a
standard normal distribution, aggregating inequalities (3) and (4) across the popu-
lation yields the following set of inequalities relating the population probability of
investing to the model parameters
F (b( 2w) + q)  Pr(invest)  F (b(2w) + q) (5)
where F() denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. The identification
region for (b, q) contains all vectors of parameters that satisfy inequalities (5).
The shaded area in Figure 3 represents the identification region estimated by re-
placing Pr(invest) with the proportion of investments observed in our sample. It
is immediate from (5) that q is point-identified and equal to F 1(Pr(invest)) when
expectations have no influence on the decision process (b = 0). Otherwise, the ob-
served proportion of investments is compatible with any combination of b > 0 and q
within the shaded area. We can easily see that the identification region of the social
preference parameter q increases with b, the strength of the effect of expectations on
investment behavior.
A smaller identification region can be derived by assuming that all senders ex-
pect to receive when they invest at least or more than when they do not (E(rinvesti ) 
E(rkeepi )). Under this assumption, inequality (3) remains unchanged as it does not
violate the new restriction on beliefs. Inequality (4) on the other hand concerns
the lowest possible payoff difference, a difference of 0 under the new restriction
9
(E(rinvesti ) = E(r
keep
i ). In this case, senders i will invest when
b( w) + q + ei > 0. (6)
Aggregating inequalities (3) and (6) across the population produces a new set of in-
equalities relating the population probability of investing and the model parameters
F (b( w) + q)  Pr(invest)  F (b(2w) + q) . (7)
The smaller identification region derived from (7) is given by the dark shaded area
in the Figure (3). As expected, the new area is a strict subset of the area derived
previously as it places much tighter upper bounds of the social preference parameter
q.
Anotherway to reduce the size of the identification region is to assume that senders
have objectively correct (rational) expectations. This would imply that E
 
rinvesti

and
E

rkeepi

both coincide with observed average responder behavior, rinvest and rkeep,
and are common for all players. Then, the identification region is a line, connecting
all values of b and q that solve
F

b(rinvest   rkeep)  bw+ q

= Pr(invest). (8)
The dashed straight line in Figure 3 represents the estimated identification region ob-
tained under the assumption that beliefs are rational, estimated by replacing rinvest
and rkeep with the corresponding sample averages. We see that the assumption of
rational expectations does not point identify the model parameters. This follows be-
cause all players are assumed to have the same information set. Hence, there is no
variation in beliefs across players that would be needed for the point-identification
the model parameters.
In our experiment, however, participants have heterogeneous beliefs (see section
2.3). This fact not only contradicts the rational expectation hypothesis but can be
exploited to point identify the parameters. To illustrate this, we finally estimate the
parameters of our model using the beliefs stated by each sender. To proceed, we
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replaced the unknown expectations E(rkeepi ) and E(r
invest
i ) in (1) and (2) with expec-
tations approximated using the cubic spline interpolation method proposed in Belle-
mare, Bissonnette, and Kro¨ger (2007).12 We find that the estimated value of b is 0.117
(standard error = 0.065) and is significant at the 5% level against the one-sided alter-
native that b > 0. This suggests that the marginal utility of income is greater than
zero. This significant relation also suggests that non-incentivized subjective beliefs
can be used to successfully predict behavior. We further find that the other-regarding
preference parameter q is 0.569 (standard error = 0.241) and significant at the 5% level
against a two-sided alternative.13 This suggests that social preferences play a signifi-
cant role in determining investments in the game. Figure 3 plots this point estimate.
We find that the point estimate lies within the first two identifications regions. The
first region was obtained by taking into account all the possible beliefs that respon-
dents could have. Therefore, the point estimate will fall by construction within this
zone. The point estimate could fall outside the second identification region if the be-
liefs of players systematically violated the maintained assumption on beliefs, i.e., that
senders will not be worse off when investing (E(rinvesti )  E(rkeepi ), used to derive the
second identification region. In our data, however, all senders expect to receive from
the responder at least as much if they send their endowment than if they keep it.
Finally, we see that the point estimate using subjective expectations data lies in
close proximity to the dashed line representing the identified parameter combina-
tions assuming rational expectations. Moreover, we do not find significant differences
between the point estimate and the dashed line.14 Section 2.3 revealed that the distri-
12Cubic spline interpolation allows to approximate expectationswithminimal assumptions concern-
ing the shape of the underlying distributions. Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kro¨ger (2007) show that the
bias when approximating a subjective mean is negligible given the number of probability questions
answered by each sender.
13The standard errors are possibly a little conservative as they do not account for noise in the ap-
proximated expectations.
14We estimated by bootstrap the 95% confidence region around our point estimate as well as a 95%
confidence region around the dashed line by bootstrap. In particular, we generated 1000 bootstrap
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bution of subjective beliefs is centered around the observed response behavior. This
together with the fact that in the simple linear model used here to illustrate the partial
identification approach senders’ decisions are based on the mean of their subjective
expectations probably explains why the dashed line and the point-estimate are close.
A model that relies on the whole belief distribution, as for instance a model including
risk aversion, would very likely lead to a greater difference between the inferences
that one can draw using subjective vs. rational expectations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed recent developments in the area of partial identifica-
tion of econometric models using the stylized example of a binary investment game.
We have shown how bounds around model parameters can be derived under var-
ious levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of players. We have also shown
how these bounds can be used to assess the validity of using data on beliefs collected
without providing players incentives to report them truthfully. Our results provide
support for eliciting non-incentivized subjective expectations data: point estimates
using these belies fall within our most reasonable bounds. More importantly, this
paper has highlighted how the partial identification approach can be used to make
inferences in a parametric model under weak assumptions about the beliefs of players
in the investment game.
Another particularly promising area of future research would be to ask what can
be learned about the prevalence of belief dependent preferences such as reciprocity
and guilt aversion without information on beliefs. Belief-dependent preferences typ-
ically involve second-order beliefs, that is beliefs of players over the distribution of
samples, sampling with replacement the decision and beliefs of senders. We computed for each boot-
strap sample the point estimate as well as the dashed line. Computing both estimates using the same
samples allows us to control for the correlation between the estimated dashed line and the point esti-
mates that both rely on the same data. We find that both confidence regions overlap substantially.
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beliefs of other players. Elicitation of second-order beliefs is complicated by several
factors. First, the task is cognitively more demanding than collecting data on first-
order beliefs. Second, consensus effects may lead to a spurious correlation between
decisions and stated second-order beliefs, thus biasing the quantitative importance
of these preferences (see eg., Ellingsen, Johannesson, Torsvik, and Tjøtta (2010), Belle-
mare, Sebald, and Strobel (2010)). The tools of partial identification may provide a
way to learn about the relevance of these preferences while avoiding the potential
problems posed by elicitation of second-order beliefs.
The application of partial identification analysis in experimental economics goes
beyond the partial observability of player beliefs. For instance, in many common
experiments, interval responses are elicited (as opposed to point-valuations) using
multiple price lists, as discussed by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rusto¨m (2006).
Multiple price lists are frequently used in experiments to measure preference param-
eters, willingness to pay, or discount rates. Interval regressions used to analyze in-
terval responses elicited multiple price lists typically impose sufficiently strong para-
metric assumptions on the distribution of unobservables to point estimate the model
parameters (see eg. Coller and Williams (1999)). The tools of partial identification,
on the other hand, allow researchers to bound the model parameters under min-
imal assumptions about the location of the true valuations within the intervals of
each respondent. Manski and Tamer (2002) show how bounds around model param-
eters can be derived in this setting. The estimated bounds can thus be contrasted
with point estimates obtained using stronger assumptions, thus providing a basis for
model specification testing.
Finally, partial identification can also be useful to understand the preferences of
players in games with multiple equilibria. Multiplicity of equilibria severely com-
plicates point estimation of the heterogeneity in preferences of players. One way
to point identify preferences has been to assume an equilibrium selection procedure
(eg. randomly selecting one of the possible equilibriums). Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
show how bounds can be placed around the choice probabilities in discrete games
13
without imposing any equilibrium selection procedure. As we have stressed in this
paper, these bounds can then be used to performmeaningful inferences on the model
parameters characterizing the decision rules of players in the game.
14
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Figure 1: Subjective beliefs about the amount returned separately for investors (light
bars, N = 24) and non investors (dark bars, N = 14) when not investing (left panel)
and when investing (right panel).
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Figure 2: Distribution of the difference between subjective expectations of all senders
and observed average response of all responders in the event of not investing (left
graph, N = 38) and in the event of investing (right graph, N = 38).
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Figure 3: Estimated identification regions without information on subjective expecta-
tions (both shaded areas), assuming that E(rinvesti )  E(rkeepi ) (dark shaded area only),
and under rational expectations (dashed line). The point (bˆ, qˆ) denotes the parameter
estimates obtained using the subjective expectations data.
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